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The Role of Food Stamps in Consumption Stabilization  
 
Abstract: The Food Stamp Program provides assistance to households with incomes and assets 
below fixed thresholds. Although it is the largest entitlement program in the social safety net, 
little is known about the effect of food stamps on stabilizing fluctuations in household income 
and consumption. To estimate the volatility of income and the attendant reduction in volatility 
due to food stamps we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics over 1980-1999 along 
with a model of income that admits permanent and transitory components as well as random 
growth rate heterogeneity. We then specify a model relating income changes to consumption 
changes for use in a variance decomposition.  This decomposition highlights the role of food 
stamps in stabilizing food consumption volatility.  We estimate the income and food 
consumption models across a host of samples that vary in the degree of ‘risk’ of food stamp take-
up, ranging from all families to those families that lie below the gross income threshold for food 
stamp eligibility.  We find that across all families food stamps reduced income volatility by 
about 3 percent and consumption volatility by about 4 percent, but this stabilizing role is a much 
more pronounced 12 and 14 percent among families at high ex ante risk of food stamp 
participation.  Despite the positive role of the Food Stamp Program in smoothing income and 
consumption shocks there was a marked decline of nearly two-thirds in the income and 
consumption smoothing benefits of the program in the early 1990s relative to the 1980s. This 
stabilizing role improved only modestly by the end of the 1990s.  
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 The Food Stamp Program is an integral component of the social safety net in the United 
States.  This cornerstone of food assistance programs works under the principle that everyone 
has a right to food for themselves and their families and, hence, with few exceptions, the 
program is available to all citizens who meet income and asset tests.  Most participants receive 
an Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card for the purchase of food in authorized, privately run 
retail food outlets.  Subject to passing the income and asset limits, the program is an entitlement 
to needy families, and participation moves countercyclically with the state of the macroeconomy 
(Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio 2003).  At its peak in 1994 over 27 million people received food 
stamp benefits at an expense of $25 billion to the federal government.  In terms of total 
expenditures, the Food Stamp Program lies between the major cash-assistance program, 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and the major work-support program, the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (Scholz and Levine 2002).  In some states with low TANF benefit 
levels, food stamp benefits can constitute more than 50 percent of the disposable income of 
TANF recipients.  Despite the Food Stamp Program’s entitlement status and its potential role as 
a consumption-insurance mechanism when incomes and assets are transitorily (or permanently) 
low, research on the consumption stabilizing impact of food stamps is largely absent. In this 
paper we examine the effect of food stamps on income and consumption volatility.  
Food stamps are part of an extensive system of government programs that provide 
income insurance when incomes are low.  These so-called automatic stabilizers are designed to 
smooth consumption in the face of both aggregate business-cycle shocks and idiosyncratic 
shocks such as an adverse health event or a significant change in family composition.  Some of 
these programs are explicit and fall under the rubric of “social insurance” (e.g., unemployment 
insurance (UI), social security, and disability insurance). Others are known as “means-tested 
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transfers,” including TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid.  In addition to these explicit programs 
there are more subtle, but equally important, insurance programs in the U.S. tax code such as the 
federal income tax, the payroll tax, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  While there has 
been research on the consumption-smoothing benefits of UI (Hamermesh 1982; Gruber 1997), 
TANF (Gruber 2000), and income taxes (Auerbach and Feenberg 2000; Kniesner and Ziliak 
2002a,b), research on the potential stabilizing benefits of the Food Stamp Program is lacking.  
Rectifying the scarcity of research on the stabilizing role of food stamps is especially 
important after the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA). This legislation eliminated the old cash assistance program, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and replaced it with the block-granted TANF 
program. In addition, the 1996 welfare reform had a direct effect on the Food Stamp Program by 
ending the eligibility of some recipients, reducing average benefit levels, and requiring states to 
replace paper coupons with EBT cards.  Beyond the direct effect this legislation had an indirect 
effect of the Food Stamp Program because nearly half of food stamp recipients also receive cash 
welfare. Perhaps of more importance from the perspective of the insurance benefits of income 
transfers, PRWORA eliminated the entitlement status of AFDC. Consequently the Food Stamp 
Program is positioned more prominently as a potential idiosyncratic and countercyclical 
consumption stabilizer for low-income households.   
 We use data on household heads from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) over 
1980–1999 to examine the effect of food stamps on income and food consumption stabilization.  
Specifically we treat food stamps as cash and ascertain the effect of food stamp income on 
income volatility, defined as the squared residual from a human-capital income growth model 
with and without unobserved heterogeneity. We then posit an empirical model relating 
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consumption changes to idiosyncratic income changes, macroeconomic shocks, and changes in 
observed demographics.  The estimated effect of income changes on consumption changes is 
then used as an input for a variance decomposition of the role of food stamps on food 
consumption volatility.  We permit heterogeneity in the impact of food stamps on income and 
consumption smoothing by splitting the sample based on ‘risk’ of food stamp take-up, ranging 
from a low-risk sample of all families to a high-risk sample of families with current incomes less 
than 130 percent of the poverty line. 
 We find that across all families food stamps reduced income volatility by about 3 percent 
and consumption volatility by about 4 percent, but this stabilizing role is a much more 
pronounced 12 and 14 percent among families at high ex ante risk of food stamp participation. 
Despite the positive role of the Food Stamp Program in smoothing income and consumption 
shocks there was a marked decline of nearly two-thirds in the income and consumption 
smoothing benefits of the program in the early 1990s relative to the 1980s.  This situation had 
improved only modestly by the end of the 1990s.  
II. Background 
Households have to meet three financial criteria to qualify for the Food Stamp Program: 
the gross income, net income, and asset tests. A household’s gross income before taxes in the 
previous month must be at or below 130 percent of the poverty line. Households with disabled 
persons or headed by someone over the age of 60 are exempt from this test (although they must 
pass the net income test). After passing the gross income test, a household must have a net 
monthly income at or below the poverty line.  The Food Stamp Program calculates net income in 
the following manner.  First, a standard deduction is subtracted from a household’s gross 
income. Households with earnings from the labor market then deduct 20 percent of these 
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earnings from their gross income. Deductions are also taken for child care and/or care for 
disabled dependents, medical expenses, and excessive shelter expenses.  Finally, net-income-
eligible households must meet a liquid-asset test (i.e. non-business, non-housing assets) and 
vehicle-value test. All net-income-eligible households with liquid assets less than $2,000 qualify 
for the program ($3,000 for households headed by someone over age 60). The value of a vehicle 
above $4,650 (in 2002) is also considered an asset unless it is used for work or for the 
transportation of disabled persons. The amount of food stamps a family receives is equal to the 
maximum food stamp benefit level minus 0.3 times its net income.  So a family with zero net 
income will receive the maximum benefit level.  Food stamp recipients must occasionally 
recertify their continuing eligibility and the proper amount of benefits.  The frequency of 
recertification depends on the state of residence and the source of a household’s income.   
 We now turn to a discussion of changes in eligibility and participation rates in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  Using a sample of families from the PSID (described below), we present in Figure 1 
the percentage of households eligible for food stamps under three criteria—the income test 
alone; the asset test alone; and by both tests. We concentrate on the final category.  We present 
this information for the four calendar years of our sample where complete asset information is 
available—1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998.  These four years permit us to illustrate how food stamp 
eligibility rates change in periods near the peaks of economic expansions (1988 and 1998) and 
near the troughs of economic contractions (1983 and 1993). 
[Figure 1 here] 
 From 1983 to 1988 the number of households eligible for food stamps fell by almost 15 
percent.  A similar fall occurred from 1993 to 1998.  This is consistent with our expectations 
insofar as an improving economy leads to declines in the poverty rate (see, e.g., Gundersen and 
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Ziliak 2002) and, hence, the number of households eligible for food stamps.  From one 
contraction to the next and from one expansion to the next, we also observe declines in the 
number of eligible households.  This appears to be in large part due to the steady decline in the 
number of asset eligible households, from 33.5 percent in 1983 to 21.3 percent in 1998.  The 
constant nominal asset eligibility criteria, coupled with the secular increase in real wealth 
through the 1990s, is likely responsible for this decline.   
[Table 1 here] 
For various income categories, in Table 1 we document the proportion of households 
participating in the Food Stamp Program.  As in Figure 1, we confine our analysis to the years 
with asset information in the PSID, and for brevity, limit our discussion here to food stamp 
eligible households (i.e. households that pass both the income and asset tests).  From 1983 to 
1998 there was a secular decline in the participation rates among eligible households.  In 1983, 
about 45 percent of eligible households received food stamps but by 1998 this fell to 26 percent.  
We use annual income for our measure of food stamp eligibility, but the Food Stamp Program 
uses income from the previous month as the eligibility criteria.  Nevertheless, our estimates of 
participation rates are similar to analyses using monthly data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP).  Using data from the second half of the 1992 calendar year, 
Gundersen and Oliveira (2001, Table 1) report a monthly participation rate amongst eligible 
households of 40.0 percent.  In 1993, our participation rate is a slightly lower 31.2 percent.1, 2    
The ratio of food stamp benefits to income in Table 1 (defined over all gross income and 
asset eligible households, not just food stamp recipients) also fell by a large amount over this 
time period, from 6.8 percent in 1983 to 3.0 percent in 1998.  The ratio of food stamp benefits to 
transfer income started in 1983 at almost 20 percent but fell to a little less than 15 percent in 
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1998.  In the analysis below one should note the potential interactions between the Food Stamp 
Program and other transfer programs.  For example, households receiving TANF or SSI are 
categorically eligible for food stamps, though the income from such programs is used in 
determining the size of the food stamp benefit.  On the other hand household’s receiving UI are 
not categorically eligible for food stamps, but again the income from UI is used in determining 
the size of the food stamp benefit.  The latter implies that a laid-off household head who 
subsequently receives UI must also apply for food stamps and that the food assistance will be 
less than a similarly situated household with no UI income.  These program interactions may 
explain part of the stability of the food stamp to transfer income ratio.   
 
III. Empirical Framework 
 The data presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate that there were cyclical and secular 
changes in the utilization of food stamps over the 1980s and 1990s.  In this section we propose 
an empirical framework to document how these changes translated into changes in the program’s 
role as an income and consumption stabilizer.  While food stamps are an in-kind transfer 
program the bulk of research on the program treats food stamp benefits as cash.  Moreover, in 
general, most food stamp recipients are inframarginal, implying that they spend more on food 
than that allotted by food stamps (Fraker 1990) and, in our samples, all food stamp recipients are 
inframarginal. As a consequence we expect food stamps to smooth both income (i.e. cash 
income plus food stamps) and consumption. One other possibility is for the receipt of food 
stamps to lead to a decrease in the number of hours worked.  This negative labor supply response 
may then lead to more stable cash income.  However, previous studies have found there is only a 
small change in the labor supply of food stamp recipients in comparison to similar non-recipients 
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(Hagstrom, 1996; Fraker and Moffitt, 1988). In the absence of any sizable labor supply response 
the model below captures something akin to the insurance value of the program. 
A. Income Volatility  
We begin our empirical analysis with a model of income volatility.  Specifically we 
follow the recent literature on earnings instability (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Dynarski and 
Gruber 1997) by decomposing income into ‘permanent’ and ‘transitory’ components.  The 
general structure of the income model for household i in time t is given as 
(1) ,)(ln ittitii
d
it txty ηθγδµ ++++=  
where dity  is disposable income, iµ  is a household-specific and time-invariant permanent 
component determining log income, tiδ  permits household-specific random growth into the 
income process, txit )( γ  admits observable demographics to affect income growth, tθ  captures 
year-specific shocks to income, and ititit νηη += −1  is parameterized as a random walk (under the 
assumption that itν  is serially uncorrelated and has constant variance) to permit serial 
dependence in income levels.  We define disposable income as )1( itit
d
it gyy +≡ , where 
it
it
it y
G
g =  is the average food stamp transfer rate defined as the ratio of food stamp benefits (Git) 
to after-tax (non food stamp) income.     
 First differencing equation (1) to eliminate the time-invariant permanent component and 
the random walk yields the focal income equation of interest 
(2) ittiti
d
it xy νψγδ +++=∆ ln , 
where tψ is a re-normalized vector of time effects.  In equation (2) we allow for unrestricted 
correlation between iδ  and xit, but no correlation between itν  and iδ  or xit. Government policy 
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stabilizes disposable income through many avenues.  Our interest here lies in determining how 
the Food Stamp Program has affected the variance of itν  over the past two decades.  To this end 
we estimate the model in equation (2) via the standard fixed-effects estimator with and without 
food stamps included in the dependent variable (i.e. with git permitted to be nonzero or forced to 
be zero ∀i,t) and construct the year-by-year estimate of the residual variance as ∑
=
N
i
itN 1
2ˆ1 ν . For 
robustness purposes we also estimate models with the random growth heterogeneity term iδ  
suppressed. 
 B. Consumption Volatility 
 The purpose of the Food Stamp Program is “…to provide low-income persons of limited 
resources with access to a nutritious, healthful diet (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and 
Nutrition Service, p. 7).” Two central questions are then:  How does the volatility of income 
translate into the volatility of consumption? and How does the Food Stamp Program assist in 
mitigating those consumption changes?   
 To address these questions we draw from the extensive literature on consumption 
insurance between and within households (Deaton 1992, 1997).  The theory of complete 
consumption insurance postulates a central planner who allocates resources under uncertainty 
across households and over time to equalize the growth rates in the marginal utilities of 
consumption.  Under the standard assumption of isoelastic household preferences, the key 
testable implication derived from the theory is that once one controls for aggregate resources and 
the state of the economy, idiosyncratic resources do not determine household consumption 
growth.  This prediction has been tested by a number of authors and with few exceptions the 
assumption of complete insurance is rejected (Attanasio and Davis 1996; Cochrane 1991; 
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Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 1996).  The implication then is that consumption growth is a 
function of both aggregate and household-specific resources.  Moreover, based on the results of 
Attanasio and Davis (1996), Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2001), and Kniesner and Ziliak 
(2002a), even if complete insurance is not present, channels of partial insurance clearly exist to 
stabilize consumption.  We examine whether and by how much the Food Stamp Program 
functions as such a channel. 
Consider, then, the following model of consumption growth for household i in time t  
(3) it
d
ittit yc εβα ∆+∆+=∆ lnln ,  
where c is consumption expenditures, tα  is a vector of time dummies capturing aggregate 
resources, and itε∆  is an unobserved temporary household-specific error term.  The specification 
in equation (3) sweeps out any time invariant unobserved heterogeneity in consumption levels, 
and can readily admit random growth-rate heterogeneity in itε∆  (Kniesner and Ziliak 2002a).  
Importantly the theory of complete insurance predicts that idiosyncratic income changes do not 
affect consumption changes conditional on controls for aggregate resources (i.e. 0=β ).3 
However, if insurance coverage is only partial, e.g. via food stamps, then, a priori, we would not 
expect 0=β . 
   Equation (3) yields estimates of the impact of income growth on consumption growth.  
For the purposes of stabilization policy we need to identify how food stamps affect the variance 
of consumption growth (akin to equation (2) for income volatility). In what follows, we set 
itεα ∆== 0 .  This nets out the effects of group insurance and random shocks or measurement 
errors, and, by setting 0=α  we adjust the scale of insurance but we do not alter the relative 
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contributions of food stamps across households or over time.  The variance of consumption 
growth is then defined as  
(4) )ln()ln( 2 ditit yVarcVar ∆=∆ β . 
With an estimate of β  we can ascertain how food stamps reduce the variability of consumption 
changes after we substitute for the connection between the variation in disposable income and 
food stamps. 
 After taking the natural log of disposable income, first differencing, and noting that the 
log of 1 plus a small number is approximately the small number the variance decomposition is 
expressed as 
 (5) )},ln(2)()ln({)ln( 2 ititititit gyCovgVaryVarcVar ∆∆+∆+∆≈∆ β . 
In equation (5) the key component for stabilization is the covariance term between log income 
changes and changes in the average food stamp transfer rate.  Because food stamp benefits rise 
when income falls, this covariance should be negative and thus consumption should be less 
volatile with than without food stamps.  Likewise, provided that 10 <≤ β  then consumption 
overall will be less volatile than income overall.4  
In order to implement equation (5) we require an estimate of β  and estimated income 
and food stamp transfer rate variances and covariances.  Because income changes are likely to be 
measured with error we obtain estimates of β̂  from equation (3) via an instrumental variables 
estimator.5  We construct estimates of the variance of ityln∆  using equation (2), and for the 
estimated variance of itg∆  we run models akin to the income regressions but replace the 
dependent variable with itg∆ . Finally, using the residuals from the latter regressions we 
construct the covariance between non food stamp disposable income and the average food stamp 
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transfer rate. We identify the importance of food stamp benefits in consumption stabilization by 
examining the decomposition in (5) with and without food stamps. 
 IV. Data 
 Our data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for interview years 
1980–1999 (calendar years 1979–1998).6  The survey has followed a core set of households 
since 1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off into new 
families.  Following the 1997 survey year the PSID began interviewing households every other 
year; thus, there are no data for the 1997 calendar year.  The PSID is advantageous because it 
contains detailed information on income and household composition. Our sample spans the 
major recent income tax reforms in the United States, which occurred in 1981, 1986, 1990, 1993, 
and 1997, as well as state (1992–1996) and federal (PRWORA) welfare reforms. 
The sample we use is an unbalanced panel treating missing observations as random 
events. By eliminating only a missing person year of data, the time series for each household can 
be of different length within 1980–1999. To be included in the sample the household head must 
(1) be in the sample at least three years, (2) be at least 25 years old in 1980, and (3) not be a 
student, permanently disabled, or institutionalized.  To further reduce the influence of possible 
outliers we follow the existing literature and delete person-years with more than a 300 percent 
increase or more than a 75 percent decrease in consumption and family income. We also require 
annual food expenditures (inclusive of food stamps) to be no less than $520 and annual family 
income to be no less than $1,000.  With our basic sample filters ((1)–(3) above) we obtain 8,485 
households over the 19-year sample.  After imposing these filters, dropping households with 
missing data, and by requiring households to be present for at least three years, we retain a 
maximum of 59,088 household-years for the analysis. 
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To estimate the effect of food stamp benefits on income and consumption volatility we 
define the relevant populations of interest who are likely to be affected by food stamp policies.  
To this end, we consider several alternatives to the pooled sample of all families.  These 
alternatives are based on the ‘risk’ of taking up food stamps and include families whose current 
incomes are below 130 percent of the poverty guideline (income eligible), those whose income 
ever fell below 130 percent of the poverty guideline (ever eligible), and those whose average 
family incomes fall in the first quartile of average sample income (lifetime poor).7      
 The focal variables in our models are food consumption expenditures, gross labor and 
capital income, taxes, transfers, and demographics.  In the PSID food expenditures include (non-
food stamp) food purchases eaten inside the home and food purchases eaten outside the home.  
To this measure we add food stamp benefits.8  Income and food stamp benefits are available in 
every wave of the PSID.  Unfortunately the PSID did not collect any food expenditure data 
except for food stamps in the 1988 and 1989 interview years, which eliminates three possible 
consumption changes for the model in equation (3) used in estimating β̂ .  
Along with consumption we require data on income and demographics.  We define gross 
income as the sum of labor earnings plus income from rent, interest, and dividends. Transfers 
include social insurance (Social Security, SSI, AFDC, and veteran’s benefits) and private 
transfers (child support, alimony, and gifts from relatives). Because the main sources of transfers 
are income conditioned, transfer payments are one of two main components of insurance 
supporting disposable income and in turn consumption. The other component of consumption 
insurance, income taxation, needs some discussion about its calculation. 
 The PSID ceased collecting information on household income tax liability after the 1991 
interview year.  Hence we approximate the income tax liability via several steps.  First, using a 
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method derived by MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) and implemented by Ziliak and 
Kniesner (1999), we approximate federal income tax payments with a smooth cubic polynomial 
in taxable income.  The idea is to act as if the household faces a smooth tax function rather than a 
piecewise-linear function and then approximate the marginal tax rate.  Because the marginal tax 
rate is a smooth and continuously differentiable function of taxable income we can integrate the 
function back to obtain total tax payments.  From total federal tax payments we net out the 
imputed Earned Income Tax Credit for each year (assuming a 100 percent take-up rate) and add 
in FICA (payroll) taxes and the relevant state income tax payments, which for tractability we 
take as a proportional tax on income with the tax rate determined by the average income tax rate 
in the state (U.S. State Government Tax Collections, 1980–1999 Tax Years).9 
V. Results 
 Before turning to the question of the effect of food stamp benefits on food consumption, 
we first consider how food stamp benefits influence income volatility via equation (2).  To 
estimate changes in the residual income variance we control for a host of demographics (i.e. the 
xit) that may affect income growth. These controls include family size, number of children, age 
of the youngest child, marital status, level of education of the head, race of the head, five-year 
birth cohort of the head, head’s self-employment status, union status, health status, industry, and 
occupation.  We also control for state-specific variables such as the unemployment rate, the 
growth rate in Gross State Product, indicator variables for the party affiliations of the governor 
and the state legislature, indicators for the implementation dates of AFDC/TANF welfare reform, 
indicators for region of country, and year fixed effects.  Appendix Tables 1 and 2 contain 
parameter estimates from the income growth models without and with fixed effects. 
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A. The Food Stamp Program and Income Volatility 
In Figure 2 we present changes in income volatility for the years 1980 to 1998. As 
described in the Data Section, we present results for a variety of samples based on the ex ante 
risk of food stamp participation—(1) all households, (2) households with current income less 
than 130 percent of the poverty line, (3) households whose income ever fell below 130 percent of 
the poverty line, and (4) households with average income in the first quartile.  While we estimate 
our models with and without fixed effects, in the interest of simplicity we only report the fixed 
effects models in the figures although both are included in the tables. 
[Figure 2 here] 
 As seen in Figure 2, higher income households had lower levels of income volatility than 
lower-income households. The highest levels of income volatility were for ever-income eligible 
families (i.e. families with incomes below 130 percent of the poverty line at some time during 
the sample period) and for the lifetime poor.  Income volatility rose in the early to mid 1980s and 
then declined for most of the samples until the decade’s end. Despite different samples and 
empirical models, these patterns are broadly consistent with those documented in Gottschalk and 
Moffitt (1994) and Dynarski and Gruber (1997).  Gottschalk and Moffitt focus on the wages and 
salaries of white male heads of household and their sample ends in 1987 and Dynarski and 
Gruber focus on total labor earnings of all male heads regardless of race and their sample ends in 
1991. We examine both male and female household heads; model income more broadly to 
include labor earnings, capital income, taxes, and transfers; and follow our sample until 1998.  
From 1990 until 1993 (from 1991 for the income eligible sample), there was a marked 
increase in income volatility across all our samples.  This surge in residual income volatility in 
the early 1990s is notable because by most measures the recession of 1990–1991 was relatively 
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mild, especially in comparison to the early 1980s recession. Moreover, since the typical poor 
family earns no capital income, the increase in volatility among poor families is most likely 
coming out of the labor market. Importantly, these years were also different for another reason – 
both food stamp and AFDC caseloads rose over 30 percent.  Plausibly, this higher income 
volatility contributed to rising caseloads in the early 1990s.  After 1993, there was a two-year 
reduction in income volatility followed by another mild increase after 1995. 
[Table 2 here] 
 In an effort to reduce income volatility, families may choose to enter assistance 
programs, including the Food Stamp Program.  In Table 2 we record the average percent 
reduction in income volatility over the 1980–1998 period due to food stamps for the models with 
and without fixed effects.  As documented in Table 2, on average food stamps lower income 
volatility across all families by about 3 percent, but this reduction is upward of 12 percent among 
the income eligible.  In other words, the insurance value of food stamps is greatest for those most 
in need (as defined by income) of food assistance benefits. 
      [Figure 3 here]  
These averages, however, mask the distinct changes taking place over this time period in 
the Food Stamp Program’s role as an income stabilizer.  In Figure 3 we report the percent decline 
in income volatility due to food stamp benefits over the 1980s and 1990s.  From the figure it is 
clear that food stamps reduce the level of volatility, especially for the income eligible sample.  
For example, among income eligible families in the early 1980s the Food Stamp Program 
reduced income volatility by upwards of 19 percent, but in the early 1990s, just when income 
volatility and program participation surged, food stamps became less effective in smoothing 
income, reducing the transitory variance by only 5–10 percent, and as low as 2.5 percent in 1994. 
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While there was a temporary rebound just prior to PRWORA in the effectiveness of food stamps 
the program clearly is not as important as an income stabilizer at the end of the 1990s relative to 
the early 1980s.   
B. The Food Stamp Program and Food Consumption Volatility 
 Food stamps lead to a reduction in income volatility, especially for the primary intended 
recipients of food stamps.  We now assess the role of food stamps as a stabilizer of food 
consumption.  A key input in the variance decomposition of equation (5) is an estimate of β̂  
from equation (3), which reflects the extent to which consumption changes in response to income 
changes.  In Table 3 we record instrumental variables estimates of income changes on (real) food 
consumption changes.  In addition to the log income change and time dummies the empirical 
consumption model controls for changes in family size, the number of children, the age of the 
youngest child, and marital status, the level of education of the head, the race of the head, and the 
five-year birth cohort of the head.  For clarity of presentation we suppress the latter variables and 
only record the point estimates associated with the income change.  As instruments for the 
income change we use time (t-1) levels of the head’s annual hours of work, after-tax hourly 
wage, self-employment status, health status, union status, home-ownership status, industry, 
occupation, and region of country, as well as the time t state-level variables capturing the party 
affiliation of the governor, the party affiliation of both houses of the legislature, the real 
maximum AFDC/Food Stamp benefit, the unemployment rate, the growth rate of the state’s 
GSP, the food stamp error rate (the amount of overpayment and underpayment of food stamps), 
and indicators for the year the state’s welfare-reform waiver or TANF program was 
implemented, and for the implementation of the statewide EBT program. 
[Table 3 here] 
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As documented in Table 3, food consumption elasticities with respect to income changes 
range from a low of 0.047 for the lifetime poor to a high of 0.130 for all families pooled together. 
Relative to more broad measures of consumption used in Kniesner and Ziliak (2002a) these 
elasticities of food consumption with respect to income are small.  This is perhaps not too 
surprising since food is about 10 percent of total expenditures for the typical household but 
around 20–30 percent for the poor. Using the estimated β̂  from each sample in Table 3, in 
Figure 4 we document food consumption volatility without food stamps.  Food consumption is 
significantly less volatile than income.  In light of the relatively small parameter estimates in 
Table 3, this lower volatility is not unexpected.  Interestingly, while the income eligible families 
experience great volatility in both income and food consumption, the lifetime income poor and 
the ever eligible, who have high income volatility, actually have comparatively low food 
consumption volatility because of the very weak link between income changes and food 
consumption changes.  On the other hand the pooled sample of all families, who had the lowest 
income volatility, have relatively high food consumption volatility.10 As with income volatility, 
food consumption volatility did rise after 1990 although this increase is small for the ever poor 
and lifetime poor. 
[Figure 4 here] 
 The second panel of Table 2 records the average percent reduction in food consumption 
volatility due to food stamps.  Consistent with one of the targeting mechanisms of the Food 
Stamp Program (i.e., the inverse relation between income and benefit levels), income eligible 
and households with low average incomes have the largest reductions in food consumption 
volatility, averaging 12.2 (13.8) percent and 9.6 (9.0) percent in the models without (with) fixed 
effects.  Noteworthy is that the average reduction in uncertainty of food consumption exceeds 
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that of income.  This is attributable to the negative covariance between income changes and 
benefit changes in the variance decomposition.   
[Figure 5 here] 
Parallel to our results for income volatility, the reduction in food consumption volatility 
due to food stamps has been declining over time as depicted in Table 5.  During and immediately 
following the recession of the early 1980s gross-income-eligible families had their food 
consumption stabilized by upwards of 22 percent from food stamps, and those families whose 
incomes were in the 1st quartile of average income smoothed consumption changes upwards of 
15 percent in the same period.  However, by 1993 and during the peak of consumption volatility, 
the variance reduction from food stamps plummeted to 5 percent and 3 percent for each group, 
respectively.  After this low point the role of food stamps in stabilizing food consumption 
volatility rose to about 6–7 percent for these groups just before and after passage of PRWORA.  
    [Figure 6 here] 
The consumption insurance offered by the Food Stamp Program fell in the 1990s relative 
to the 1980s.  There are many possible explanations for this.  We believe one of the more 
compelling possible reasons is the change in the take-up rate of food stamps over this time 
period.  As seen in Table 1, the take-up rates fell substantially from the 1980s to the 1990s. As an 
indirect test of this conjecture, we conduct a counterfactual experiment whereby we fix the 
residual variance of the food stamp transfer rate and the covariance between income and food 
stamps at the high point of insurance (the 1981 recession year) for the gross income eligible 
group, but allow the variance of income to change over time.  This exercise identifies how much 
smoothing of food consumption would have been provided by the Food Stamp program in the 
1990s if incomes and benefits were as strongly correlated as they were in the early 1980s.  In 
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terms of our models, a fall in consumption smoothing from food stamps is then attributable to 
some combination of declines in take-up rates and non-increases in food stamp benefits.  Since 
the latter is a function of inflation, we believe the decline in take-up rates is the possible primary 
mechanism behind the fall in consumption smoothing benefits.  Our results are found in Figure 
6.  A comparison of this figure with Figure 5 demonstrates the importance of the changing 
relation between benefits and income.  In both figures, after 1990 there was a fall in the 
insurance benefits of food stamps.  However, in Figure 6 this fall is markedly less pronounced, 
especially for the groups with higher ex-ante probabilities of receiving food stamp benefits.  We 
believe one should ascribe at least a portion of this difference to the fall in food stamp take-up 
rates. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Our results suggest that participation in the Food Stamp Program smoothes the volatility 
of both income and consumption.  On average food stamp benefits lower the transitory variance 
of income changes by about 3 percent across all families over the 1980s and 1990s but these 
benefits smooth income upwards of 12 percent among those families with the greatest ex ante 
risk of entering the program.  Because food stamp benefit changes are negatively correlated with 
income changes, the Food Stamp Program lowered food consumption volatility by almost 14 
percent among the high-risk families who are currently income eligible for food stamps.   
However, the average stabilizing role of food stamps masks important time series 
changes in the effectiveness of the program in mitigating income and consumption changes.  
Beginning in 1990 the influence of food stamps as a stabilizer of income and consumption 
changes fell by nearly two-thirds, while volatility overall increased demonstrably.  This higher 
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variance likely stems from labor-market instability insofar as this increase is found among both 
current and lifetime low-income families who typically have no capital income.   
Along with research on the reasons underlying this higher volatility in the early 1990s 
research is also needed on why the consumption smoothing benefits of food stamps diminished 
in the early 1990s and was only partially restored by the end of the 1990s.  We believe three 
factors may be especially pertinent.  First, in the early 1990s, there was an unexpected increase 
(based on previous relations between the macroeconomy and food stamp caseloads) in food 
stamp caseloads.  Gleason, Schochet, and Moffitt (1998) showed this increase was primarily due 
to longer stays in the Food Stamp Program.  These longer stays may have been surprising to 
recipients (just as they were to researchers) and, therefore, the usual smoothing role of food 
stamps may have changed.  If the post-1996 era is back to the “usual case,” the increase seen in 
the consumption-smoothing role of food stamps amongst the income eligible may be consistent 
with the results here.  Second, the early 1990s was a time of rising income and food consumption 
volatility. This may also have been unexpected and, therefore, the usual consumption smoothing 
role people expected from food stamps may have correspondingly declined.  Lastly, our 
counterfactual experiment whereby we hold fixed the covariance of income and food stamp 
benefits at its early 1980s level indicates that part of the decline in consumption smoothing in the 
1990s is from the secular decline in food stamp take up rates in the PSID.       
Another issue implicitly raised by our paper is also worth pursuing.  We demonstrated the 
consumption smoothing benefits of the Food Stamp Program, but there remain a large number of 
non-participating eligible households.  Depending on the method of estimation, between 40 and 
60 percent of eligible households do not participate.  For some households, the inverse 
relationship between food stamp benefits and income may be a deterrent insofar as low benefit 
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levels may not be sufficient to overcome the transaction and stigma costs associated with food 
stamps.  The 30 percent participation rate for households with incomes between 100 and 130 
percent of the poverty line is consistent with this explanation (Castner and Cody, 1999, Table 
III.6).  Even if these households were to participate the increase in food stamps’ consumption 
smoothing role is likely to be small due to the low benefit levels.  There remain, however, many 
households who would receive high benefits and still choose not to participate.  The reasons for 
this choice and the alternative methods they may (or may not) use to smooth consumption are 
worth pursuing.  This research is especially relevant in light of the rather dramatic decline in 
participation in the Food Stamp Program when, due to increased income volatility, we may have 
expected just the opposite.     
In distinction to the declining use of food stamps as a consumption smoothing 
mechanism, recent research has demonstrated the increased importance of the income tax code 
(i.e. the combined federal income tax, the EITC, the payroll tax, and the state income tax) in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (Kniesner and Ziliak 2002b). Part of this is due to the sizable 
expansions in the EITC and the payroll tax rate and base, and as demonstrated here part is due to 
reduced effectiveness of an important income-transfer program.  With the contraction of the 
welfare state emanating from the 1996 welfare reform, income transfers overall are a less readily 
available channel of income insurance.  Because the Food Stamp Program is the remaining 
entitlement in the social safety net, it is likely to increase in importance as an income and 
consumption stabilizer within the pool of means-tested transfers.  The results of this paper, 
however, indicate that programs and policies in addition to food stamps are necessary to smooth 
incomes and, in turn, consumption among vulnerable low-income families. 
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Figure 2. Income Volatility without Food Stamps
 All Families  Gross Income Eligible
 1st Quartile Ave Income  Ever Income Eligible
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Figure 3. Reduction in Income Volatility due to Food Stamps
 All Families  Gross Income Eligible
 1st Quartile Ave Income  Ever Income Eligible
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Figure 4. Food Consumption Volatility without Food Stamps
 All Families  Income Eligible
 1st Quartile Inc  Ever Income Eligible
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Figure 5. Reduction in Food Consumption Volatility from Food Stamps
 All Families  Income Eligible
 1st Quartile Inc  Ever Income Eligible
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Figure 6. Counterfactual Reduction in Food Consumption Volatility
Year
 All Families  Income Eligible
 1st Quartile Income  Ever Income Eligible
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Table 1: Food Stamp Participation Rates and Average Food Stamp Transfer Rates  
in the 1980s and 1990s by Eligibility Criteria 
 1983 1988 1993 1998 
All Families  
  Food stamp participation rate (%) 7.22 6.03 3.40 2.01 
  Food stamps as a share of income  (%) 0.88 0.80 0.51 0.18 
  Food stamps as a share of transfer income (%) 3.27 2.37 1.86 1.08 
  Number of observations 3018 3529 2583 1685 
Income Less than 130 Percent of the Poverty Line     
  Food stamp participation rate (%) 40.88 36.34 23.71 21.05 
  Food stamps as a share of income (%) 5.98 5.76 4.02 2.29 
  Food stamps as a share of transfer income (%) 17.74 14.13 13.57 12.14 
  Number of observations 406 454 312 114 
Income Less than 200 Percent of the Poverty Line     
  Food stamp participation rate (%) 24.43 22.13 14.09 10.54 
  Food stamps as a share of income (%) 3.25 3.18 2.20 1.09 
  Food stamps as a share of transfer income (%) 10.83 8.43 7.58 5.70 
  Number of observations 798 872 589 256 
Income Less than 130 Percent of the Poverty Line and Assets 
Less than Asset Limits 
    
  Food stamp participation rate (%) 45.64 42.01 31.22 26.13 
  Food stamps as a share of income (%) 6.78 6.82 5.27 2.95 
  Food stamps as a share of transfer income (%) 19.85 15.91 17.87 14.60 
  Number of observations 333 357 221 88 
Income Less than 130 Percent of the Poverty Line in at Least 
One Year 
    
  Food stamp participation rate (%) 19.74 16.01 10.64 7.48 
  Food stamps as a share of income (%)  2.53 2.21 1.70 0.74 
  Food stamps as a share of transfer income (%) 8.85 6.27 5.81 4.01 
  Number of observations 1038 1274 761 401 
Average Income in Bottom Quartile     
  Food stamp participation rate (%) 23.40 21.19 15.38 11.29 
  Food stamps as a share of income (%) 3.34 3.20 2.38 1.14 
  Food stamps as a share of transfer income (%) 9.51 8.03 8.56 6.43 
  Number of observations 658 835 481 239 
Food Stamp Participants in at Least One Year     
  Food stamp participation rate (%) 34.38 27.44 19.13 15.11 
  Food stamps as a share of income (%) 4.19 3.65 2.87 1.41 
  Food stamps as a share of transfer income (%) 15.58 10.80 10.46 8.14 
  Number of observations 634 776 460 225 
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Table 2: Average Percent Reduction in Income Volatility and Food Consumption 
Volatility due to Food Stamps 1980–1998 
  
All Families 
 
Income Eligible 
Families 
 
Ever Income 
Eligible 
Families 
 
Families with 
Average Income in 
the First Quartile 
     
 Income Volatility 
 
3.34 
 
11.09 
 
5.99 
 
8.62 
 
Without Fixed Effects 
    
With Fixed Effects 3.05 12.47  5.54 8.09 
     
 Food Consumption Volatility 
 
Without Fixed Effects 
 
3.72 
 
12.21 
 
6.63 
 
9.55 
     
With Fixed Effects 3.39 13.82 6.13 8.99 
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Table 3: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of Log Income Changes 
On Log Food Consumption Changes 
  
All Families 
 
Income Eligible 
Families 
 
Ever Income 
Eligible 
Families 
 
Families with 
Average Income in 
the First Quartile 
 
0.130 
 
0.109 
 
0.054 
 
0.047 
 
Change in Disposable Income 
(0.043) (0.045) (0.050 ) (0.063) 
     
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample sizes are as follows: 48,462 in All Families; 6,312 in 
Families with Current Income Less than 130 Percent of the Poverty Line; 28,873 in Families with Imputed Assets 
Less than the Food Stamp Asset Limits; and 10,734 in Families with Average Income in the First Quartile. 
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Appendix Table 1:  Estimates for Change in Income and Change in Income Plus Food Stamp Benefits:   
By Food Stamp Eligibility Family Type, No Fixed Effects 
 All Families Gross Income 
Eligible Families 
Ever Income 
Eligible Families 
Families with 
Average Income 
in the First 
Quartile 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Number of Kids -0.022 -0.022 0.050 0.052 -0.017 -0.016 -0.030 -0.027 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) 
Family Size 0.026 0.026 -0.009 -0.010 0.021 0.020 0.033 0.031 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 Age of Youngest Child 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Marital Status -0.014 -0.012 -0.060 -0.056 -0.020 -0.017 -0.026 -0.023 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
Age of Household Head -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age of Household Head Squared 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Self-Employed 0.008 0.008 -0.094 -0.097 -0.004 -0.004 -0.032 -0.033 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.040) (0.038) (0.017) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026) 
Disabled -0.001 -0.002 0.034 0.034 -0.004 -0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Union 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Head is White 0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.009 0.009 0.011 0.015 0.018 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Less than High-School Education -0.009 -0.010 0.080 0.076 0.002 -0.001 0.014 0.011 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
High-School Education -0.010 -0.010 0.042 0.042 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Northeast 0.003 0.003 0.017 0.014 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
North-central 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.009 0.010 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
South 0.009 0.008 0.045 0.040 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.015 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.025) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) 
Occupation-Professional 0.010 0.010 0.004 -0.011 0.023 0.021 0.052 0.051 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.073) (0.069) (0.019) (0.018) (0.033) (0.032) 
Occupation-Managers 0.009 0.008 -0.163 -0.161 -0.004 -0.004 0.032 0.037 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.075) (0.074) (0.029) (0.029) (0.063) (0.062) 
Occupation-Clerical -0.004 -0.005 -0.018 -0.029 -0.008 -0.011 0.022 0.020 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.048) (0.046) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) 
Occupation-Craftsmen 0.006 0.007 -0.087 -0.078 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.041) (0.040) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.026) 
Occupation-Operators 0.000 -0.000 -0.041 -0.041 -0.003 -0.004 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.038) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023) 
Occupation-Farming -0.024 -0.025 -0.066 -0.072 -0.053 -0.057 -0.085 -0.090 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.076) (0.073) (0.042) (0.041) (0.063) (0.061) 
Occupation-Services -0.003 -0.005 0.007 0.007 -0.013 -0.015 0.006 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.043) (0.042) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) 
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 All Families Gross Income 
Eligible Families 
Ever Income 
Eligible Families 
Families with 
Average Income 
in the First 
Quartile 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Industry-Agriculture 0.033 0.032 0.073 0.071 0.065 0.065 0.090 0.091 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.065) (0.062) (0.037) (0.036) (0.057) (0.055) 
Industry-Mining 0.029 0.028 -0.007 -0.025 0.057 0.055 0.032 0.035 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.084) (0.085) (0.041) (0.041) (0.075) (0.075) 
Industry-Manufacturing 0.023 0.022 -0.001 -0.010 0.034 0.033 0.040 0.037 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.036) (0.034) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023) 
Industry-Transportation 0.022 0.022 -0.008 -0.020 0.045 0.043 0.054 0.051 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.055) (0.053) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.030) 
Industry-Wholesale 0.017 0.017 -0.037 -0.039 0.029 0.028 0.017 0.015 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.037) (0.035) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.023) 
Industry-FIRE 0.034 0.034 -0.007 -0.031 0.074 0.071 0.051 0.044 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.068) (0.062) (0.024) (0.023) (0.034) (0.032) 
Industry-Business/Repair 0.015 0.014 -0.033 -0.041 0.026 0.023 0.020 0.017 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.051) (0.049) (0.022) (0.021) (0.036) (0.035) 
Industry-Personal Services 0.016 0.017 -0.003 -0.002 0.022 0.024 0.013 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.042) (0.040) (0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026) 
Industry-Entertainment 0.030 0.030 0.159 0.158 0.059 0.061 0.045 0.042 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.084) (0.084) (0.045) (0.045) (0.054) (0.054) 
Industry-Professional 0.029 0.028 -0.029 -0.037 0.043 0.042 0.033 0.031 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.040) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) 
Industry-Public Administration 0.033 0.033 0.083 0.060 0.062 0.061 0.053 0.045 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.069) (0.066) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.035) 
Governor is a Democrat -0.024 -0.023 -0.081 -0.078 -0.068 -0.064 -0.046 -0.041 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.046) (0.044) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.031) 
Both State Houses Democrat 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Both State Houses Republican 0.025 0.026 0.011 0.014 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.038 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.071) (0.065) (0.041) (0.040) (0.048) (0.045) 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Real State Maximum AFDC and 
Food Stamp Benefit Levels (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment rate -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gross State Product 0.256 0.246 0.091 0.047 0.330 0.303 0.196 0.159 
 (0.063) (0.061) (0.208) (0.196) (0.125) (0.121) (0.145) (0.139) 
Waiver for AFDC/TANF 0.005 0.004 0.042 0.031 0.046 0.042 0.067 0.062 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.042) (0.041) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) 
Head Born After 1956 0.019 0.017 0.077 0.056 0.035 0.026 0.038 0.020 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.046) (0.043) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036) (0.034) 
0.014 0.013 0.046 0.039 0.032 0.030 0.035 0.029 Head Born 1946–1955 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.027) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) 
-0.008 -0.008 -0.020 -0.024 -0.012 -0.011 -0.018 -0.018 Head Born 1926–1935 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) 
-0.002 -0.001 0.019 0.017 -0.012 -0.009 -0.015 -0.010 Head Born 1916–1925 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.035) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) 
0.005 0.007 0.040 0.039 -0.011 -0.006 -0.024 -0.018 Head Born Before 1915 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.046) (0.044) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Income in column (1) does not contain food stamps while income in 
column (2) does contain food stamps. The sample sizes are as follows: 59,088 in All Families; 7,716 in Families 
with Current Income Less than 130 Percent of the Poverty Line; 34,997 in Families with Imputed Assets Less than 
the Food Stamp Asset Limits; and 13,246 in Families with Average Income in the First Quartile.  
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Appendix Table 2:  Estimates for Change in Income and Change in Income Plus Food Stamp Benefits:   
By Food Stamp Eligibility Family Type, Fixed Effects 
 All Families Gross Income 
Eligible Families 
Ever Income 
Eligible Families 
Families with 
Average Income 
in the First 
Quartile 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Number of Kids -0.044 -0.043 -0.016 -0.007 -0.041 -0.038 -0.057 -0.048 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) 
Family Size 0.055 0.056 0.061 0.058 0.049 0.049 0.066 0.064 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
0.001 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 Age of Youngest Child 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Marital Status 0.008 0.006 0.019 0.012 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.042) (0.039) (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) 
Age of Household Head -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Age of Household Head Squared 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Self-Employed 0.007 0.005 -0.071 -0.078 0.003 -0.001 -0.043 -0.050 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.048) (0.045) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.029) 
Disabled -0.004 -0.005 0.011 0.010 -0.008 -0.010 0.005 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Union 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.009 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Northeast -0.035 -0.037 0.113 0.023 -0.092 -0.099 -0.106 -0.121 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.182) (0.170) (0.061) (0.059) (0.091) (0.087) 
North-central 0.012 0.013 0.057 0.056 0.007 0.014 -0.056 -0.051 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.140) (0.130) (0.052) (0.051) (0.073) (0.070) 
South 0.001 0.001 0.309 0.286 0.024 0.027 -0.040 -0.035 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.141) (0.131) (0.054) (0.052) (0.071) (0.068) 
Occupation-Professional 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.033 0.006 0.005 0.031 0.033 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.104) (0.097) (0.030) (0.030) (0.048) (0.046) 
Occupation-Managers 0.015 0.015 -0.037 -0.057 0.008 0.005 0.084 0.084 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.087) (0.081) (0.033) (0.032) (0.064) (0.061) 
Occupation-Clerical -0.004 -0.005 -0.030 -0.050 -0.018 -0.020 0.011 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.061) (0.057) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.032) 
Occupation-Craftsmen 0.023 0.023 -0.023 -0.030 0.044 0.042 0.028 0.025 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.058) (0.054) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.035) 
Occupation-Operators 0.007 0.004 -0.055 -0.073 0.008 0.002 -0.006 -0.016 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.056) (0.052) (0.022) (0.021) (0.033) (0.032) 
Occupation-Farming -0.026 -0.026 0.081 0.079 -0.035 -0.035 -0.045 -0.050 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.115) (0.107) (0.055) (0.054) (0.079) (0.076) 
Occupation-Services -0.008 -0.010 -0.020 -0.034 -0.021 -0.024 0.012 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.058) (0.054) (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.032) 
Industry-Agriculture 0.024 0.023 0.019 0.022 0.056 0.055 0.104 0.108 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.098) (0.091) (0.047) (0.045) (0.067) (0.064) 
Industry-Mining 0.074 0.072 0.100 0.078 0.092 0.087 0.157 0.156 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.189) (0.176) (0.080) (0.077) (0.164) (0.157) 
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 All Families Gross Income 
Eligible Families 
Ever Income 
Eligible Families 
Families with 
Average Income 
in the First 
Quartile 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Industry-Manufacturing 0.050 0.048 0.120 0.112 0.057 0.054 0.066 0.063 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.054) (0.051) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.034) 
Industry-Transportation 0.043 0.041 0.182 0.161 0.080 0.076 0.125 0.115 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.084) (0.078) (0.029) (0.028) (0.053) (0.050) 
Industry-Wholesale 0.041 0.040 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.047 0.046 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.053) (0.049) (0.023) (0.022) (0.034) (0.032) 
Industry-FIRE 0.059 0.056 0.137 0.089 0.139 0.131 0.073 0.061 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.094) (0.087) (0.036) (0.035) (0.051) (0.048) 
Industry-Business/Repair 0.040 0.038 0.071 0.059 0.066 0.061 0.041 0.036 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.065) (0.060) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043) (0.041) 
Industry-Personal Services 0.036 0.036 0.085 0.086 0.047 0.049 0.024 0.026 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.059) (0.055) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038) (0.037) 
Industry-Entertainment 0.065 0.064 0.322 0.315 0.156 0.157 0.163 0.160 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.127) (0.118) (0.056) (0.054) (0.081) (0.078) 
Industry-Professional 0.056 0.054 0.115 0.108 0.079 0.074 0.072 0.066 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.059) (0.055) (0.026) (0.025) (0.036) (0.034) 
Industry-Public Administration 0.048 0.046 0.225 0.179 0.079 0.074 0.065 0.052 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.086) (0.080) (0.031) (0.030) (0.050) (0.047) 
Governor is a Democrat -0.016 -0.013 -0.202 -0.158 -0.101 -0.092 -0.081 -0.069 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.113) (0.106) (0.054) (0.053) (0.070) (0.067) 
State House and Senate is Democrat 0.003 0.002 0.018 0.007 0.021 0.017 0.022 0.017 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.023) (0.022) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) 
State House and Senate is Republican 0.025 0.025 -0.014 -0.029 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.022 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.086) (0.081) (0.044) (0.043) (0.053) (0.051) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Real State Maximum AFDC and Food 
Stamp Benefit Levels (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment rate(t) -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Gross State Product 0.251 0.242 0.214 0.143 0.336 0.313 0.184 0.151 
 (0.066) (0.064) (0.230) (0.214) (0.137) (0.133) (0.161) (0.154) 
State had Waiver for AFDC/TANF 0.001 0.000 0.063 0.051 0.051 0.048 0.079 0.073 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.049) (0.046) (0.025) (0.024) (0.031) (0.030) 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Income in column (1) does not contain food stamps while Income in 
column (2) does contain food stamps. The sample sizes are as follows: 59,088 in All Families; 7,716 in Families 
with Current Income Less than 130 Percent of the Poverty Line; 34,997 in Families with Imputed Assets Less than 
the Food Stamp Asset Limits; and 13,246 in Families with Average Income in the First Quartile. 
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 Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Note that this is a lower participation rate than the 65 percent rate reported in Blank and Ruggles (1996, Table 1). 
The critical distinction is that Blank and Ruggles focus on single female heads of households while we examine 
participation across the much broader population of single and two-parent families with and without children. 
2 The 26 percent participation rate in 1998 is lower than expected.  While some of this is due to real declines in food 
stamp participation by low income households, there are at least two other reasons specific to the PSID.  First, in 
1998, the PSID switched from an annual to a bi-annual questionnaire.  This longer period of recall may have lead 
some households to underreport their food stamp participation status.  Second, the oversampling of the low-income 
population was no longer conducted by the PSID.  As seen in Table 1, this lead to a much lower number of 
households eligible for food stamps and, therefore, increased the size of the confidence interval around our estimate.    
3 For other recent work using this general framework see, e.g., Gruber (1997); Ham and Jacobs (2000); Hayashi, 
Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996); Kniesner and Ziliak (2002a); and Morduch (1995).  
4 This framework can be extended to distinguish between transitory and permanent income shocks on consumption 
volatility.  As an insurance mechanism, the Food Stamp Program does not discriminate between temporary and 
permanent shocks.  If a household satisfies the liquid asset and vehicle value requirements they can begin drawing 
benefits the first day of the month following an income drop below the gross (and net) income limit; the program 
rules do not distinguish between these two types of shocks. Our model captures a net effect of temporary and 
permanent shocks.  The insurance value of the program, however, may be differentially affected by temporary and 
permanent shocks.  (See Blundell and Pistaferri (2003) in this issue.)   
5 Kniesner and Ziliak (2002a) use a forward-filter IV estimator, which is more efficient than the standard 2SLS 
estimator.  However, 2SLS is consistent, which is all that is needed for our purposes here.  
6 We begin our sample in 1980 for two reasons: one, the PSID began collecting better tax information in 1980, and 
two, this is when the Food Stamp Program ended the so-called purchase requirement.  (Under the purchase 
requirement, recipients needed to pay for a set amount of discounted food stamps with the price directly related to a 
household’s income.) 
7 Because assets are only measured in five-year intervals in the PSID, we impute liquid assets for each year by 
capitalizing the sum of rent, interest, and dividend income with the 3-month U.S. Treasury T-bill rate (Ziliak and 
Kniesner 1999).  We correctly predict food stamp asset eligibility and non-eligibility 75 percent of the time with our 
imputed measure when compared against actual liquid assets in 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998. 
8 As discussed previously, the vast majority of food stamp participants are infra-marginal.  Therefore, adding food 
stamps to cash food expenditures is a valid assumption because the percentage of households for whom this would 
not hold (i.e. the extra-marginal households) is small.   
9 The assumption of 100% take up in the EITC overstates actual program utilization.  Scholz (1994) estimated 
participation in 1990 to be on the order of 85 percent; however, with increased generosity and advertisement in the 
1990s it is likely higher by the end of our sample period. As shown in Kniesner and Ziliak (2002a) the smooth tax 
function approximates PSID generated tax payments very well and yields comparable parameter estimates of the 
insurance value of the U.S. federal income tax system. 
10 The weak link between income changes and food consumption changes for the lifetime poor relative to better off 
families, which translates into lower levels of consumption volatility, may be due in part to the presence of the 
consumption floor of income transfers.  For inframarginal food stamps recipients, food consumption is likely 
stabilized by not only food stamps but also other transfers such as AFDC/TANF, unemployment insurance, and SSI.  
However, in results not tabulated, the link between consumption changes and income changes is significantly higher 
for the poor than non poor when consumption is measured with nondurable consumption or total expenditures.  
